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Second Paper.
ENGLISH CASES INVOLVING CONTRACTS CONTAINING AN

OPTION.
In the first paper' I tried to show that in the eighteenth
century a contract would not be enforced in equity if there
was a lack of mutuality in the obligations of the parties.
This lack of mutuality might exist though the contract was
good at law. Thus contracts in which one party held an
option were not generally enforcible at the instance of the
party holding the option. Agreements by a lessor to
renew a lease at the option of the lessee were, however,
always enforced. In this paper I shall take up the cases in
England involving contracts containing an option, and try
to show how the rule granting specific performance to the
lessee of the lessor's covenant to renew the lease was
extended to all cases in which the plaintiff held an option.
' May,
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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS.

In view of the want of clearness which we frequently find
in discussions of what we may call "optional cases," it will
be well to fix in our minds at the outset what is meant by a
contract containing an option. If A. for a consideration
moving from B. agrees to let B. have the right to purchase
his, A.'s, land for a sum certain, we have a contract between
the parties in which A. is bound to sell if B. chooses to exercise his option. B. is not bound to buy. This is an example
of a contract in which B. has an option. It is a unilateral
contract. A. has agreed to sell on certain conditions. If
B. performs the conditions, that is signifies his intention to
complete the purchase, A. must perform his promise or break
his contract. A., having given the option in a contract,
based by supposition on a consideration, an attempt by A.
to withdraw the option before B. elects to take has no effect
on the contractual relation between the parties.
In spite of the simplicity of the elements of a contract containing an option, there is a tendency to confuse such contracts on the one hand with a continuing offer, and on the
other with a contract to enter into a contract. An offer is
not a contract. An offer is one of the steps leading to a
contract. It is from its very nature subject to withdrawal
at any time before acceptance by the offeree. Thus if A.
says to B.: "I will give you until four o'clock to-morrow to
accept or reject my offer," B. does not have an option. A.
has merely designated the time when his offer without
further notification to B. shall be withdrawn. A.'s thus designating a particular time when the offer shall at all events
be withdrawn, does not prevent him from withdrawing the
offer before that time.
Examples of contracts to enter into a contract are rare.
It is of course possible for one man to agree with another
for a consideration to accept an offer made by that other
should the offer be made within a given time. In such a
case the non-acceptance of an offer when made would be a
breach of the first contract. The fact that the offer was
not accepted shows that there is not in existence a second
contract. There has been no meeting of minds by which
meeting only the second contract can come into existence.
There can be no such thing as specific performance of the
second contract, for there is no second contract.
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Besides a contract containing an option, a continuing
offer, and a contract to enter into a contract, we may have
an agreement without consideration to give an option. For
example, A. and B. may both sign a written agreement that
A. shall have until a particular time to elect to purchase a
specific article from B. at a designated price, but A. may
have given no consideration for B.'s promise. There is
a strong tendency on the part of the courts to treat an agreement without consideration containing an option, as a continuing offer on the part of the party giving the opti6n,
which, if not withdrawn before election on the part of the
holder of the option, makes a binding contract as of the date
of the election. At present I shall postpone a consideration
of this question and confine myself to those cases illustrating
the specific performance of contracts based on a considera)
tion and containing an option.
I have stated that the right of a lessee to compel specific
performance by the lessor of his covenant to renew the lease
at the lessee's option was an exception to the general rule of
the "eighteenth century which denied specific performance in
all cases where only one party was bound. In this country
leases with options to renew on the part of the lessee are rare.
In England and Ireland they are common, and.occur both in
leases for years and in leases for lives. Thus one may let
his land for a term of years giving the lessee a right to
demand a new lease for another term. In this case it is
usual to provide that the lessee shall notify the lessor of his
desire to have a new lease within a time certain, such as six
months, before the termination of the old lease. In the
lease for lives it is customary to provide that three months
or other certain time after the death of any one of the lives
for which the lease extends, the lessee shall, if he so elects,
nominate a new life and pay a fine to the lessor, and then
the lessor shall grant a new lease inserting the person nominated, in place of the life that has dropped. All the leases
discussed in the reports of the cases which we shall mention
are for three lives. In either leases for years or lives if the
original lease provides that the new lease which the landlord is to give at the demand of the tenant, shall contain
a clause giving the tenant an option to again renew, then the
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right of the tenant in the land may continue forever and the
original and each subsequent lease is said to contain a clause
for perpetual renewal.
According to a note by Ridgeway 2 leases for lives with
clauses for perpetual renewal had their origin, at least in
Ireland, as the result of the disturbed condition of the country between the years 1643 and 166o. This assertion is
taken from a case in manuscript, Burnell v. Inchiquin,
decided in 1794. In this case the bill recites that the Irish
Catholic tgentry during the Commonwealth surrenderect
their land to great lords, receiving them again as leaseholds
for lives, the leases containing clauses for perpetual renewal.
Whatever the cause of the invention of these leases we know
that the original lease in a case reported in 1787, Boyle v.
Lysaght,3 dates from 166o. It is certain, however, that
they did come into general use in Ireland after the Revolution of 1688, as by the English statute of the eighth and
ninth William III., the Earl of Ormond is expressly given
the right to make such leases on his estates. The Earl seems
to have used his privilege to encourage settlement on the
large tracts of waste land owned by him. Similar leases
have existed in England from the last half of the seventeenth century. Whether earlier or not I am unable to say.
The earliest case in the reports involving these leases,
Bridges v. Hitchcock,4 was decided in 1715. The original
lease in that case was for twenty years with a covenant to
renew for a further term of twenty years. The plaintiff
lessee had spent a considerable sum of money on the premises, and his counsel pointed out, that the covenant to grant
a new lease, "was the only foundation and encouragement"
he had for this expenditure. The court granted the prayer
of the bill for the renewal of the lease with a clause providing for re-renewal at the option of the lessee. The point of
want of mutuality was not, as far as the report shows, raised
by either court or counsel.
What is the explanation for this omission to raise the
point of lack of mutuality, which point, when raised a few
i TRidgw.,

p. 178.

'V. & S., 135.
42

Brown, P. C., 256.
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years previously in Bromley v. Tefferies, where the option
was in a marriage settlement had proved fatal to the plaintiff ?' Is it that Bromley v. Jefferies was a careless decision founded on a misconception of the prevalent rules
of law? The other cases in the eighteenth century discussed
in the first paper, and which indicate a similar idea of the
defence of lack of mutuality, cover too wide a field to admit
of this explanation. It is, I believe, merely an instance of
a conflict which so often exists between the general legal
rule and an economic fact. There was at the beginning of
the eighteenth century, if the conclusions reached in the
previous paper are correct, a general idea that equity would
not enforce a contract where one party only was bound. But
at the time Bridges v. Hitchcock was decided, leases with
options to renew had not onlybeen in existence forsome time,
but a large amount of land was held under such leases. To
have denied specific performance to the lessee would have
unsettled a large number of titles. Had there been many
cases involving mere options to purchase in simple contracts,
without any previous lease and possession, it is probable
that the court of equity would have soon recognized and discussed the conflict between the rule enforcing covenants to
renew, and the rule denying specific performance in cases of
options to buy in other contracts. But cases where the facts
were like those in Bromley v. Jefferies were few. The cases
arising under leases following Bridges v. Hitchcock are very
numerous. An examination of the way the court dealt with
these cases will show us the point of view from which such
leases were regarded and make plain why the defence of lack
of mutuality did not occur to either court or counsel. For
Bridges v. Hitchcock is not peculiar in this respect. I have
collected the other reported cases in the note, and in not one
of them is the defence of lack of mutuality suggested.6
' The case is reported in 2 Ven. 415, 1700. I have discussed it at length
in the May number of this magazine. To understand the present discussion a careful reading of the case is necessary.
'In the following cases specific performance of a covenant to renew

at the option of the plaintiff was granted, the question of mutuality not
being raised by court or counsel; Bridges v. Hitchcock, i Bro. P. C.
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Some of these cases discuss the effect of the neglect of the
tenant tq give notice of his desire to renew the lease, and
pay the fine on the dropping of one of the lives. Others
discuss the question whether the new lease should contain a
clause for re-renewal at the option of the tenant. The spirit
in which both of these questions are considered is that of the
interpretation of grants of land rather than that of the construction of contracts. 7 This is especially noticeable in the
256, 1715; Sweet v. Anderson, 2 Bro. P. C. 430, 1722; Hyde v. Skinner,
2 P. Wms. 196, 1723; Bathhurst v. Gill, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 32, 1724; Davis

v. Taylor, Harg. Jur. Argum, 427, 1726; Charles v. Rowley, 6 Bro. P. C.
430, 1765; Russel v. Darwin, 2 Bro. C. C. (Perkins ed.) 499, note, 1767;
Cooke v. Booth, 2 Cowp. 81g, 1778; O'Neill v. Jones, i Ridgw. 170, 1785;
Boyle v. Lysaght, V. & S. 135, 1787; Tritton z. Foote, 2 Bro. C. C. 499,
1789; Rawstorne v. Bentley, 4 Bro. C. C. 415, 1793; Iggulden v. May, 9

Ves. 325, i8o4.
In the following cases specific performance of covenants to renew at
the option of the plaintiffs was denied, on the ground of the laches of
the plaintiffs, and not because of any lack of mutuality: Ripon v. Rowley,
M. S. S. 1723, cited i Ridgw. 194; Allen v. Hilton, M. S. S. 1738, cited
Fonblanque's Equity, Bk. i, Ch. 6, Sec. 12, note c.; Pendreth v. Griffith,
4 Bro. P. C. (Ist ed.) 512, 1744; Kane v. Hamilton, i Ridgw. i8o
(about 1778) ; Bateman v. Murray, i Ridgw. 187 (about 1779) ; Magrath

v. Muskerry, V. & S. 166, 1787; Bayly v. The Corporation of Leomminster, i Ves. 476, 1792; Baynham v. Guy's Hospital, 3 Ves. 295, 1796;

Chesterman v. Mann, 9 Hare 2o6, 1851.
The following cases are cases involving the specific performance of
covenants to renew leases arising in the eighteenth and first part of
the nineteenth centuries in which the lessee was bound to renew, and
therefore the question of the specific performance of optional cintracts
is not involved: Lord Ross v. Worsop, 4 Bro. P. C. 411, 1740;
Furnival v. Crew, 3 Atk. 83, 1744; Taylor v. Stibbert, 2 Ves.
437, 1794; Deane v. Marquis of Waterford, i S. & L. 451, note, 1795;

Eaton v. Lyon, 3 Ves. 6go, 1798; More v. Foley, 6 Ves. 232, i8oi. In
foregoing cases specific performance was granted; in the following
cases of the same class it was denied: Jackson v. Saunders, i S. & L.
443, 18o2; City of London v. Mitford, 42 Ves. 41, 1807.

'The only two cases cited above not discussing one or both of these
questions are Bathurst v. Gill, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 32, 1724; Taylor v. Stib-

bert, 2 Ves. 437, 1794. In the last case the covenant was enforced against
a purchaser who took with notice.
A clause for re-renewal was put in the new lease in the following
vases: Bridges v. Hitchcock, 2 Brown P. C. 256, 1715; Furnival v. Crew,
3 Atk. 83, 1744; Cooke v. Booth, 2 Cowp. 81g, 1778; Boyle v. Lysaght,
V. & S. 135, 1787.
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treatment of the question of laches. There is in this respect
a difference in the Irish and English cases. In England the
neglect of the plaintiff lessee, who held the option to renew,
to notify his landlord and pay his fine within the specified
time, was treated leniently, but the clause specifying the time
of notice was not, as in Ireland, totally disregarded. 8
In the following cases the court decreed a new lease omitting the
clause for re-renewal: Hyde v. Skinner, 2 P. Wms. I96, 1723; Davis v.
Taylor, cited Harj. Jud. Arg. 427, 1726; Russel v. Darwin, 2 Bro. C. C.
499, note, 1767; Tritton v. Foote, 2 Bro. C. C. 499, 1789; Moore v. Foley,
6 Ves. 232, i8oi; Igguiden v. May, 9 Ves. 325, 1804.
A clause involving perpetual renewal is not against the policy of the
law, but it will not be inferred without the language is unequivocal.
It will not be inferred from a covenant "to renew with like covenants,"
though it would appear that Lord Hardwicke thought otherwise in Furnival v. Crew, 3 Atk. 83, 1744. In all the cases where perpetual renewal
has been granted, either the language or the actions of the parties
showed that that was the meaning which the parties intended to give
to the original covenant to renew. The only case of doubt is that of
Furnival v. Crew itself. There the covenant was not only to "execute
one or more lease or leases under the same rents and covenants as
are expressed," etc., but also, "and so continue the renewing of such
lease or leases . . . from time to time, according to the true intent
and meaning of said indenture" (p. 84). In the first case cited,
Bridges v. Hitchcock, it had been intended that the lessee should put
up a new mill and do other acts, which he would not be likely to do if
he did not expect a perpetual lease. In Cooke v. Booth and Boyle v.
Lysaght the parties themselves had construed their contract by renewing the original lease with a covenant for re-renewal.
'In the following English cases the neglect of the plaintiff lessee
did not defeat his right to a renewal: Lord Ross v. Worsop, 4 Bro. P.
C. 411, i74o; Rawstorne v. Bentley, 4 Bro. C. C. 415, 1793.
In the following English cases the laches of the plaintiff defeated his
right to renewal: Ripon v. Rowley, M. S. S., 1723, cited in I Ridgw.
194. In this case the request for renewal was to be made within one
year from the dropping of a life, and it was not made for ten years. Allen
v. Hilton, Fonb. Eq. Book i Ch. 6 Sec. 12, note c., M. S. S. 1738: This
was a lease of a colliery. The lessee was to notify the lessor within
three months of the expiration of the old lease. He did not notify
until one month before the expiration of the old lease. Bayly v. The
Corporation of Leomminter, I Ves. 476, 1792: There was here a covenant to renew on the part of the lessor, when one of three lives should
drop. The lessee requested a renewal after two of the lives had dropped.
Baynham v. Guy's Hospital, 3 Ves. 295, 1896, was a similar case,
except that there all three lives seem to have dropped. Eaton v. Lyon,
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The earliest reported case arising in Ireland under these
leases is Sweet v. Anderson.9 This was a lease for three
lives, each life being renewable. One of the lives left the
kingdom in 1697, another died in 1714. Nothing is
said as to existence of the third life. In 1715 the lessee
offered to pay the fine on all three lives and asked for a new
lease for three lives. The lessor resisted, but the court on
appeal confirmed the decree of specific performance made in
1717 by the Irish courts. The grounds of the decision on
appeal are not stated. Subsequently to this decision it seems
to have been the custom for the Irish courts not to regard
the dropping of even all the lives as working a forfeiture of
the tenant's right to renew, provided he offered to pay the
three fines for renewal. 10
For a long time after 1717 no case coming from Ireland
on appeal to the English House of Lords, involved an
extreme application of the Irish practice of totally disregarding the laches of the tenant in not giving notice of his desire
2
for a renewal.1 1 About 1778 the case of Kane v. Hamilton'
3 Ves. 69o, 1798: This is a case similar to Bayly v. The Corporation
of Leomminter (supra). See also City of London v. Milford, 14 Ves.
42, I8o7, remarks of Lord Eldon, page 58, and Chesterman v. Mann,
9 Hare 2o6, 1851, where there was wilful refusal to pay the fine for
renewal.
'2 Bro. P. C. 43o, 1722.
" In calculating the fines it was estimated that a life was worth seven
years.
The Irish cases are all in manuscript. They are given in a note to the
report of the argument before the Irish courts in Bateman v. Murray,
i Ridgw. 187 (about i778), p. 193. The cases are Carpenter v. Stewart.
1733; O'Hara v. Bourke, 1756, where all three lives had dropped; Harrison v. Prendergast, 1754, Ibid.; Shore v. Darnley, 1766, where two
lives had dropped, and Kirkwood v. Tyrone, where the landlord had
already succeeded in an action of ejectment.
'The first reported case after Sweet v. Anderson is Ross v. Worsop;
4 Bro. P. C. 411, 1744. Here the lessor was away when the life dropped,
and the lessee offered to pay the fine to his agent, but the agent
wanted the lessee to accept a bill drawn on the lessee by lessor in
favor of a third person. The lessee said he would, but no bill was
ever presented to him. As the failure to renew was not the lessee's
neglect, the court ordered a renewal. In the case of Pendred v. Griffith, 4 Bro. P. C. 512, 1744, the bill was dismissed, apparently because
=i Ridgw. P. C. i8o.
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was decided by the English House of Lords. A. had mortgaged land to the defendant's ancestor, but the mortgagor
remained in possession and agreed to execute a lease for
three lives renewable forever. The tenant under the agreement attorned to the mortgagee, and on the dropping of a
life in 1842 applied to the mortgagee for a renewal. The
mortgagee refused and the matter was dropped.
The
lessee died in 1757. In 1763 his heir heard of the agreement and brought his bill for renewal. A decree in favor
of the plaintiff by the Irish courts was reversed. In view of
the facts of the case the decision would not have created
much comment in Ireland had not Lord Mansfield in his
opinion said that the English courts in Irish cases had not
adopted the Irish practice allowing renewals after the time
designated in the original lease for the lessee to make a
request had passed. He further pointed out the fact that the
Irish cases confirmed in England, and which I have just
mentioned in the note, contained peculiar circumstances
excusing the tenant for his non-performance of the conditions of renewal. This decision was immediately followed
3
by that of Bateman v. Murray."
The case is analogous to
Pentred v. Griffith. There was a lease for lives renewable on the death of any life, if demand was made and fine
paid. The husband of the plaintiff had been tenant of the
leasehold. He was also steward of the estate of the landlord. Though two lives dropped he made no request for a
renewal, and no fine was paid. At the time the bill was
filed on behalf of the heir of the tenant by his widow all
three lives had dropped. The Irish courts granted a renewal,
of a quasi fraud of the tenant, he having sublet the land on the same
lives that were in his lease, and on their dropping took fines for
renewal of the underleases, but failed to inform his landlord of the
fact. The facts of the next reported case taken on appeal to England,
Charles v. Rowley, 6 Bro. P. C. (ist ed.) 73, 1765, seems to bear out
Lord Ridesdale's opinion in Lennon v. Napper, 2 S. & L. 682, 18o2, p.
686, that all that was decided was the question whether a supposed
decree in 1723 barred the suit. There a life dropped in 71o. There
was no attempt -at renewal for thirty-seven years, but there were
actions on the part of the landlord which might have been taken to
excuse the tenant.
13 Ridgw. 187 (about 1778).
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but the English courts again reversed the decree. Lord
Thurlow followed Lord Mansfield, in saying that equity
would not relieve against gross laches, and furthermore
that the English courts would not recognize the lax practice
of granting renewals which had prevailed in Ireland. Lord
Redesdale says, in 1802, in the case of Lennon v. Napper,14
that the decision under the peculiar facts of the case was
proper even under the practice of the Irish courts. However that may be, either the decision, or the opinion or
both, seems to have created a great deal of uneasiness. Oneseventh of the land in Ireland was at this time held under
these leases. The Irish Parliament immediately passed an
Act, 19 and 2o, Geo. III., c. 30, for the "relief of tenants hold-

ing under leases for lives containing covenants for perpetual
renewal." This act provided "that the courts of equity upon
an adequate compensation being made shall relieve such
tenants (those who have neglected to renew after lives have
dropped) and their assig'ns notwithstanding such lapse of
time, if no circumstances of fraud be proved against such

tenants." This act, while it may not have reversed the law
as applied in Batenan v. Murray, annulled the effect of Lord
Thurlow's language, and made the local practice in Ireland
in regard to these leases binding on the English courts.1 5
142

S. & L. 682, 18o2.

The reported cases decided subsequent to the statute are: O'Neil v.
Jones, i Ridgw. I7O, 1785; Boyle v. Lysaght, V. & S. 135, 1787. In
the first case there was an express reservation in the lease that unless
a life was renewed within six months after a life dropped, no renewal
was to be granted. Yet the renewal was granted after at least two
lives had dropped, though it is a question if the bill- was granted,
because the court thought there had been a-subsequent promise to
renew. The case of Magrath v. Muskerry, V. & S. 1667, 1787, was
brought before the statute; the statute did not affect it and the relief
was denied.
It was held that where the landlord on the dropping of a life makes
a demand on a tenant to renew or pay the fine, the tenant must pay
the fine within a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time depends
on circumstances. Six months is suggested inDeane v. Marquis, of
Waterford, i S. & L. 451, note; more than six months had elapsed in
that case, though because of peculiar circumstances the relief was
granted, while it was denied in Jackson v. Saunders, i S. & L. 443,
18o4, though six months had not elapsed from the time of the formal
demand on the part of the lessor.
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There is no difference in principle between a lease with an
option to renew and a lease with an option to buy. While
the former are almost unknown in this country, the latter
are rare in England, and in the eighteenth century seem to
have been almost unknown. A case containing such a lease
is reported in 1785 and another in i8o8, but neither involve
the specific performance by a court of equity of the option to
purchase,16 and as far as I am aware the specific performance of such an option was not involved in any reported
English case until 1842. It was then assumed without
argument that specific performance of the option to purchase would be granted. 17
The examination of these cases involving options in leases
shows that when such a lease came before the court, the
court regarded the tenant as having from the .start a perpetual interest in the land, or at the least an interest for the
second lease, and not as having merely a contract with the
defendant. This attitude of the court of equity, so evident
from the cases, must have been the reflex of the attitude of
the country as a whole. The conditions under which these
leases seem to have first been granted, the possession of the
plaintiff and his probable improvement of the land, made it
necessary for the court to give effect to the covenant of the
lessor to renew at the option of the lessee. Had the courts
not granted specific performance they would have failed to
protect what was in the eyes of the parties and of the people
generally an existing right to possession of land. As I have
said, the economic fact was opposed to the application of the
general rule requiring mutuality in the obligation. And
that being so it is natural, not only that the court should
refuse to apply the general rule in the particular instance,
"Lawes v. Bennett, i Cox. Eq. 167, 1785; Townley v. Bedwell, 14

Ves. 591, i8o8.
' The case is Drant v. Vause, i Y. & C. C. C. 58o. There is, page
581, merely a statement that specific performance was granted, the
devisee of the lessor being defendant. The case discusses the question
whether executor or the devisee of the lessor is entitled to the purchase
money. Lessee's options to purchase were enforced in Collingwood v.
Row, L. J., 26 Eq. N. S. 649, 1857; Welchman v. Spinks, 5 L. T. N. S.
385, 1861. Specific performance is mentioned as having been granted
in a similar case in Weeding v. Weeding, i J. & H. 424, i86i.
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but it is also natural that the fact that they were pro tanto
abrogating that rule should never occur to either court or
counsel. The existence of these decisions under leaseholds
does not prove therefore that the idea that equity would have
nothing to do with a contract containing an option did
not exist. The cases are no more authority to prove such
a proposition than they show that in the eighteenth century
the courts of equity granted specific performance though the
defendant showed that the plaintiff had been guilty of gross
laches. All this becomes plain when once we grasp the fact
that the court in these cases regarded themselves as protecting interests in land, rather than exercising their jurisdiction to enforce contracts.
Nevertheless the existence of these cases under leaseholds was destined to abolish, at least in England, the idea
that there must be in equity a mutuality of obligation in
a contract notnecessarywhen a suitis brought onthe contract
at law. The passing away of the old idea of mutuality was
an unconscious process, brought about by several factors,
one of which was the tendency of the mind towards logical
consistency. If A. leases to B. with a covenant to renew
the lease for one or more terms, and B. goes into possession
and makes improvements, B. has equities to enforce a
renewal, which do not exist in a mere contract between A.
and B. in which B. has an option to purchase A.'s land. It
is possible that cases like Bridges v. Hitchcock, granting
specific performance in the first case, and cases like Bromley
v. Jefferies, denying it in the second, could have existed
until the present time had the difference between them been
examined and emphasized by the courts dealing with the
earlier cases. At the same time the only difference is the
fact of the possession of the plaintiff in the first case and his
possible improvement of the land on the faith of the defendant's covenant. In all other respects the cases are identical.
They are both contracts containing an option, and as no one
in the eighteenth century discussed the possible distinction
between them it is not unnatural that the rule granting
specific performance in the case of options in leases would
tend to become the rule in all optional contracts. Had the
cases involving the application of the original general rule
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requiring mutuality in the obligation been numerous, the
mere analogy between these cases and options in leases
would not have had any effect. But the cases applying the
general rule were few, while the cases under leaseholds seem
to have been of constant occurrence, and an old rule seldom
applied tends to be lost when the application of an exception, not recognized as an exception, becomes the daily
practice of the courts.
While we may believe the factors just mentioned had
their influence in the unconscious abrogation of the old idea
of lack of mutuality as a defence in equity, it is doubtful
by themselves they would ever have produced that result,
had it not been that the English courts of equity in the first
part of the nineteenth century made a totally different
application of the defence of lack of mutuality. This application was made in the case of Flightv. Bolland.18 It is not
necessary here to discuss this decision. I have done that
at length in my first paper. It is only necessary to point out
here that in this case the court refused to grant specific performance to an infant on the ground that the remedy was
not mutual. From that time lack of mutuality as a defence
in equity meant a definite thing, but something very far
from the lack of mutuality which defeated the plaintiff in
Bromley v. Tefferies. In the earlier case lack of mutuality
was lack of mutuality in the obligations as fixed by the
parties; in the latter case it meant that the court of equity
being unable to make the plaintiff perform his unexecuted
promises, would not force the delinquent defendant to perform his promises. Whether lack, of mutuality as a defence
had ever been perfectly clear is doubtful. It certainly was
not clear at the beginning of the nineteenth century in
England. The effect of Flight v. Bolland was to attach
a definit meaning to this indefinite defence. It clarified the
atmosphere. From that time to this, whatever confusion
has existed or still exists in this country as to the meaning of
the defence, in England, it has meant lack of mutuality in
the remedy in equity, and nothing else.
This new meaning of mutuality enabled contracts contain14 Russell

298, 1828.
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ing an option to be enforced without the necessity of regarding such enforcement as any exception to the rule. When
the party who holds the option elects to exercise it he is
bound as much as the other party. Thus if there is a contract containing an option to purchase, the plaintiff having
made his election is as much bound to pay the money, as the
defendant to convey the land, and furthermore a court of
equity can make the plaintiff perform his promise. There
is no lack of mutuality in the remedy. Simple contracts,
that is contracts not in leases, in which one party gives the
other an option to buy land, though common with us, are
rare in England. As far as I am aware no such case (subsequent to those mentioned in the first paper as denying
specific performance) arose until Emuss v. Smith, decided
in 1848.19 At that time from the causes we have detailed
the old idea of mutuality in the obligation as a special
defence in equity was forgotten, the defence of lack of mutuality in the remedy did not as stated apply; there were the
numerous cases enforcing such options in leases, and there
is no evidence that either court or counsel thought of doubting the correctness of the decree enforcing the plaintiff's
option. The case does not deal with that question, but with
the disposal of the money paid by the purchaser.2 0 And
though the case cited is the only English case on the specific
performance of options to purchase land not in leases which
I have been able to find, there would appear to be no doubt
but that the old rule of Bromley v. Jefferies, and the principle
of lack of mutuality for which it stands is completely dead
and that where a contract contains an option based on a consideration, no idea of lack of mutuality will in England ever
again prevent the party
holding the option from having
2 1
specific performance.

The development which we have examined in this and
the previous paper has, I believe, a value beyond the mere
2 DeG. & Sm. 722.
= The case states, however, page 729, that specific performance had
been granted at the suit of the purchaser.
' In Homfray v. Fothergill, i Eq. Cas. 567, 1866, an option to purchase
a partner's interest before third persons had an opportunity to buy was
enforced.
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information involved.

It illustrates one of the ways in

which legal changes are brought about. We have first a
general and important principle of law. In this instance the
principle is that it is not proper for a court of equity to
enforce a contract where one party only is bound. Contracts
in which the plaintiff has had an option are not enforced.
But the application of this principle in a single instance, the
renewal of leases, would result in the courts refusing to protect a right of property recognized by the community as
entitled to protection. In one sense the old idea is not disregarded. No one thinks of applying it to options in leases.
The exception survives in the law, without being recognized
as an exception. Circumstances make the instances of the
application of the exception numerous, while the courts have
comparatively little opportunity to apply the old general
rule. The old rule of lack of mutuality as a defence is
partially forgotten, or at least ceases to have whatever of
clearness it originally possessed. Then a case comes before
the court not under the old rule, but the old rule of lack of
mutuality as defeating specific performance is in
terms applied to the case, and thereafter the defence takes
its meaning from the facts of the new case. Lack of mutuality in the obligation becomes lack of mutuality in the
remedy. The same phrase, lack of mutuality, is used, but
the defence is different. The rule granting specific performance in the case of options in leases, is no longer an exception
to the rule requiring mutuality in equitybecause that rule has
taken on a new meaning. Thus all is prepared for the final
step which is to grant specific performance in a case not
under the original exception to the old statement of the
defence. When this step is taken optional contracts become
enforcible in equity. The old defence of lack of mutuality
passes completely away. Another and totally different rule
takes its place.
The American cases discussing the specific performance
of contracts in which the plaintiff has had an option, and
the ideas in this country of the defence of lack of mutuality
I hope to take up in my next paper.
William Draper Lewis.

